The slogan that extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence is commonly appealed to as an attempt to nullify miracle-claims, since they are probably unsupported by "extraordinary” evidence. Admittedly, this slogan is intuitive, but is it true? Must we have extraordinary evidence in order to warrant belief in any extremely unlikely event?
If we do, then we are in trouble! For you and I believe all sort of extremely improbable things without extraordinary evidence. For instance, you believe that you actually exist (I hope), which is an extremely unlikely event. There are an indefinite number of events that must have taken place in order for you to exist. Not only did your parents have to meet and find one another appealing, but one specific sperm and egg had to become fertile for you to have a chance at existing. And yet, do you require extraordinary evidence to believe that you exist? I think not.
Take the lottery as another analogy. The likelihood that those exact numbers would be drawn on any particular date is vastly improbable. Without extraordinary evidence, would someone be irrational to believe those numbers had indeed been drawn? That would be absurd. These analogies demonstrate that everyone believes all sorts of very unlikely events without the presence of overwhelming evidence to support those events. And if the slogan were true, then you would not be able to rationally believe in any of these everyday events.
But perhaps the skeptic merely wants this rule to apply to miracles or supernatural claims (special pleading fallacy). In that case, I would ask the skeptic to provide a proper standard of “extraordinary evidence,” for such a term appears subjective. Secondly, why classify miracles as extremely improbable events? Either the skeptic presupposes naturalism or he misunderstands what a miracle-claim is.
Miracles are neither events found within the laws of nature nor are they violations of the laws of nature—two common mischaracterizations. The laws of nature are descriptions of the way the world usually functions. Miracles, then, are supernatural interventions in our world—hardly a violation. If one assumes that supernaturalism is false, which presents a fallacious method, then of course a miracle would be deemed impossible. Likewise, if one believes that miracles are natural occurrences, then of course they would seem extraordinary (i.e., no Christian believes Jesus was raised from the dead out of nature).
Assuming that supernaturalism is neither true nor false, how should the probability of a miracle be calculated? Philosophers say that one ought to calculate the probability of the evidence for a miracle claim if that miracle event had not occurred. Let me rephrase it: if the miracle had definitely not occurred, what is the likelihood that you would see the same evidence? If that number turns out to be very low, then the belief in the miracle is warranted.
Apply this to the resurrection of Jesus. If Jesus had not actually risen from the dead, what is the likelihood that Jesus’ tomb would have been found empty, that the followers of Jesus would have had appearances from whom they believed to be the risen Jesus, that Paul—an enemy of the church—would have had an appearance from whom he believed to be the risen Jesus, that Paul and the other followers would have suddenly been willing to die for the belief that Jesus had risen from the dead and live completely transformed lives, and that the resurrection would be central to the earliest Gospel message? Clearly very unlikely! Therefore, the slogan that extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence is false.
Комментарии