Introducing Molinism
Molinism is most widely regarded as a doctrine of divine omniscience for its teaching of middle knowledge, although it was originally generated out of a doctrine of divine providence. The task of sixteenth century catholic theologian, Luis de Molina, was to reconcile the tension between divine sovereignty and human free will. The tension roughly goes as follows: if human beings are truly free, then God does not have full control over creation; and if God does have full control over creation, then human beings aren’t truly free. For Molina, this problem is reconciled through what he called, “middle knowledge.”
Types of Knowledge
Thomas Aquinas’s theory of God’s knowledge includes two types: natural and free. These types of divine knowledge are generally conceded by contemporary theologians. Molina developed a third kind of knowledge that occurs in between natural and free, hence the name “middle” knowledge. Note that these three types of knowledge can be ordered logically, not chronologically or temporally. Middle knowledge in no sense approaches unanimous consent amongst theologians, although it is gaining popularity in modernity.
Before explaining the three types of knowledge, it is important to clarify what philosophers mean by possible worlds. A possible world is just something that could have happened differently. For instance, it could have been the case that my parents never met, and thus, I never existed. That is an example of a possible world. Or it could be something much simpler, like talking to someone in the grocery store rather than not. Conversely, the actual world is the way things actually are. My parents did meet and I do exist! While there are an indeterminate number of possible worlds, not all possible worlds are feasible or actualizable for God. For example, in a logically possible world, everyone who lives in Australia is saved through Christ. But perhaps in that world, everyone else would be damned. So that would not be a feasible world for God to actualize. Additionally, it’s logically possible that God could create a world in which Adam and Eve never sinned. Some theologians, like myself, would argue that this world is unactualizable. Perhaps it is actualizable, but in order to actualize it God must annihilate their free will. Thus, this possible world would not be feasible for God. Now I digress to the definitions (we can use the act of creation to differentiate between them).
Natural knowledge is what God knows by a necessity of his own nature, which would be all necessary truths, such as the laws of logic or mathematical certainties. Within his natural knowledge, God would also know which of the logically possible worlds he could actualize. This kind of necessary knowledge is prevolitional—that is, occurring prior to God’s will to create the universe. Therefore, God’s essential knowledge is wholly independent of his own will.
Free knowledge is God’s knowledge of the actual world (as opposed to any given possible world)—it’s past, present, and future. God knows of all things that have occurred, all things occurring presently, and all things that will occur. God’s free knowledge is contingent upon his will to create, and is therefore postvolitional. God could have willed a completely different world (or none at all), in which case his free knowledge would be different.
Middle knowledge (scientia media)—logically posterior to natural knowledge and logically prior to free knowledge—is the view that God knows how free creatures would act in any given situation; he knows all subjunctive conditionals of free creatures. By that I mean any “if, then” statements in the subjunctive mood. Subjunctive conditional statements are appropriately called “counterfactuals” because they don’t necessarily become true. God not only knows what will happen, but he also knows what would happen. Again, this is different from knowing what could happen. For instance, God knows if I were to cheat on my wife, then she would become my ex-wife. And God knows if I had not gone to the grocery store, then I would not have been in a car accident. An incorrect example would be, if I do not go to school, then I will fail my math test. This is not a subjunctive conditional, but an indicative conditional. To place this statement in the subjunctive mood it should be stated, if I were to not go to school, then I would fail my math test. Or it could be stated in the past tense, if I had not gone to school, then I would have failed my math test. Like natural knowledge, God has middle knowledge prior to and independent of his will to create (prevolitional). Yet interestingly, unlike natural knowledge the content of God’s middle knowledge is not necessary. That is, what God knows about what creatures would freely do is contingent. God necessarily has middle knowledge, as it is independent of his will, but all true counterfactual statements are contingent upon the free acts of creatures.
Molinism does (with some exceptions) assume a libertarian account of free will. In order for human decision to be truly free, God cannot determine it. Therefore, the true counterfactual statements are entirely up to free creatures rather than on God’s will.
Perhaps a helpful summary of these three types of knowledge from the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy: “The doctrine of middle knowledge proposes that God has knowledge of metaphysically necessary states of affairs via natural knowledge, of what He intends to do via free knowledge, and in addition, of what free creatures would do if they were instantiated (via middle knowledge).”
Theory of Divine Providence
Now we can discuss how Molina addressed the tension between divine sovereignty and free will. Because of God’s natural and middle knowledge, God can, prior to the divine decree, sift through the possible worlds he could actualize and decide which of those worlds accomplishes his will. This is essentially what Molinism teaches. God knows what creatures would freely do in every possible world, and then chooses which feasible world to create. God knew that if he were to create Adam and Eve in the garden of Eden, they would betray him. God knew that if Jesus were to appoint Judas as one of the twelve disciples, Judas would betray him (not to confuse, I use the past tense “knew” because the counterfactual proposition has already occurred in the actual world). Based on all the true counterfactual propositions of each possible world, God chose to create this possible world—the actual world. Middle knowledge uniquely allows God to use free human decision to accomplish his will. But that’s not to say he doesn’t continue to providentially intervene, for he certainly does. It’s just that his divine intervention never infringes upon our free will.
If God knows what would happen in any possible world, and subsequently chose this world, then how are we truly free? First, knowledge is not a causal agent. Just because God knows that you would accept the gospel given your circumstances does not mean you were determined to accept the gospel. Rather, God simply knows what you would do under those given circumstances, and then providentially actualizes those circumstances. At every step of the way, you are still freely choosing such a decision. But if you were to freely choose something different under those same circumstances, then God would have known that you would choose something different. Second, granted it was not up to us which possible world we find ourselves in, it is however up to us which counterfactuals are true. Consider this statement: if I were born in the year 2001 in Columbus, Ohio (plus additional circumstances), then I would come to accept Christ. That counterfactual statement is true, not because of God’s will, but because of my free decision to accept Christ under those circumstances. So regardless of what possible world God chooses, you are always making the free decision.
Believing in Molinism
I do not write this essay as an attempt to persuade you towards Molinism. Rather I merely wanted to provide a useful synopsis of what Molinism teaches. Many protestants are unfavorable to this view given that Molina was attempting to counteract the protestant reformers’ deterministic understanding of human freedom. He believed that libertarian human freedom is essential to human experience and salvation, and that we should therefore attempt to preserve divine sovereignty and providence without sacrificing human free will. Here I think many contemporary protestants would agree with Molina.
The real strength of Molinism is its illumination of other doctrines. In addition to a profound doctrine of omniscience, according to Molinism God did not merely create a world blindly, being caught off guard by every free decision, nor did he have to determine everything in order to accomplish his will. Rather, by knowing all true counterfactuals he was able to set up a seemingly infinite number of circumstances to accomplish his will without compromising human freedom. Such a view only elevates God’s sovereignty and providence. Moreover, knowing what would happen under various circumstances enables a wider range of possible reasons God has for the existence of evil and suffering. Perhaps he knows that a certain good or eternally purposeful result would occur out of some evil action. It also sheds light on the question of those who have never heard of Christ. The list goes on. Regardless of one’s stance, I think it’s safe to say that Molinism should be taken seriously as a point of discussion in the church.
Questions of Molinism
There are a number of concerns raised about the theory of Molinism, none of which will be expounded in this essay. Nevertheless I find it helpful to point out these potential difficulties. First let me be clear that Molinists vary on how they respond to these questions. One is the nature of free will itself. Is a libertarian account of free will more plausible than a compatibilist or determinist view? Although the general consensus amongst Molinists is a libertarian account, some do prefer a compatibilist account of free will.
Another difficulty, and perhaps the most famous one, is what’s known as the grounding objection. It objects to Molinism on the basis of how counterfactual statements can be true and where God derives this “true” hypothetical knowledge. Prior to the divine decree, these counterfactuals only exist in possible worlds, not in the actual world. Therefore, in what sense would God know of a free decision made by a person who doesn’t exist? Molinists differ on how God possesses knowledge of counterfactuals.
Subsequently, theologians unfavorable to Molinism may be willing to grant God’s knowledge of counterfactuals, but they disagree on the logical ordering. To these theologians, God has middle knowledge logically posterior (i.e., subsequent) to the divine decree (instead of logically prior to it). Rather than saying God’s middle knowledge is based on free decision, they would argue God’s middle knowledge is grounded in God’s will. God determines which counterfactuals are true, which is nothing more than to say God determined what you would do in any given circumstance.
A fourth point of dispute is over predestination. Did God sovereignly elect certain people and then place them in circumstances for which they would choose Christ (based on his middle knowledge of those elect persons)? Or did God base his predestination on his knowledge of what creatures would freely do in the world he chooses to actualize? In simpler terms, is your predestination a result of God’s choice or your choice? Lastly is the question of Molinism’s Scriptural warrant. Is Molinism based in Scripture? I think most Molinists would affirm that the doctrine is not explicitly taught it Scripture, nevertheless it is consistent with Scripture in its affirmation of counterfactual statements (e.g., 1 Cor 2:8). These are all important questions facing Molinism.
In retrospect I hope this was an informative and interesting introduction to Molinism, albeit most likely intellectually challenging.
Christian A. Meister
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